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Abstract. !e current paper aims to present brie"y, yet clearly, the key developments of the 
complex phenomenon that is usually labeled as the ”global economic crisis”. Furthermore, 
the paper reveals some of the contagion mechanisms that transformed the American banking 
crisis into “Europe’s existential crisis”. !e paper builds on a general consent that seems to be 
emerging among scholars and politicians – “the crisis in Europe is existential. It is a question 
of whether the EU survives as a recognizable entity.” (Giddens, 2012). We totally agree with 
the fact that the American crisis and the European crisis could (and should) be now treated 
as two separate realities. However, these realities have emerged from the same root cause, 
which means that in order to understand why Europe is now struggling with its Hamletian 
dilemma, one should #rst take a close look behind the scenes of global economy.
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Financial globalization and eroded moral standards
!e current economic crisis is now considered as “an event with no precedent 
in the economic history a"er the Second World War” (European Commission, 
2009, p. 1). Despite its exceptional dimensions and implications, this crisis 
seems similar in many ways to past economic episodes, when the credit 
expansion, the low interest rates, the reduced market volatility, and the real 
estate boom have signaled the start of a recession’s episode. Just to illustrate 
the magnitude of the present crisis, one could refer to Ludwig von Mises’ 
essays, who mentioned that the Great Depression “is the unavoidable sequel 
to a boom. Such a crisis necessarily follows every boom generated by the 
attempt to reduce the <<natural rate of interest>> through increasing the 
#duciary media.” (von Mises, 2006, p. 163). Similarly, the actual crisis is the 
aggregated consequence of several macroeconomic events and factors that 
played a crucial role in shaping the future of our world. 
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However, the fact that the “American crisis” has emerged in an intensively 
globalized world, is a special characteristic and an aggravating factor. !e 
current crisis has an incomparable magnitude, which is mainly, but not solely, 
given by the globalization processes taking place everywhere in the world. L. 
Wong (2009, p. 58) put it simple: “the di$erence with 1929 is that the world 
is far more interdependent and the scale of the crisis is potentially far bigger”. 
!ese interdependent relations were analyzed by International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF’s) specialists, who concluded that, globally, “the total value of 
portfolio investment assets tripled between 2001 and 2007 from $12.7 trillion 
to $39.2 trillion, before contracting sharply in 2008 as a result of the crisis to 
$30.8 trillion. !is pattern re%ects both the increase in global liquidity and 
#nancial deepening in the mid-2000s and the subsequent retrenchment during 
the crisis (IMF, 2010a). !e phenomenon that is currently known as “#nancial 
interconnectedness” has grown exponentially just before the outburst of the 
crisis. In Figure 1 one can see the cross-border #nancial interconnectedness 
represented in the form of an aggregated index calculated my IMF economists. 
Figure 1. Cross-Border Financial Interconnectedness, 1985-2010 (IMF, 2010, p. 4)
We do not argue that #nancial interconnectedness in itself should be regarded 
as a problem per se. !e globalization processes, which have constantly intensi-
#ed a"er the end of the Cold War, produced deep and subtle transformations. 
On the one hand, “globalization has reduced the sense of isolation” (Stiglitz, 
2006, p. 4), by creating new opportunities, stimulating knowledge sharing, and 
opening up new communication channels. On the other hand, as globalization 
has created a more integrated and interdependent world, “economic globaliza-
tion has outpaced political globalization in terms of the change of mindset.” 
(Stiglitz, 2008, p. 177). In a nutshell, this meant that the global institutional set 
was not prepared for facing the challenges of a global economic and/or #nan-
cial system. No global institution has been especially designed to monitor and 
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control the global #nancial %ows, which is why the #nancial interconnectedness 
developed and grew in a manner that became impossible to regulate. 
!e lack of an institutional framework with speci#c tasks related to the manage-
ment of the #nancial interconnectedness would not have been so dangerous if 
the business sector, in general, had premised its success on an ethical behavior. 
J.E. Stiglitz (2010), a Noble Prize winner, speaks about the “the avarice triumph 
over prudence”, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission points out to the “sys-
temic breakdown in accountability and ethics” (2011, p. xxii), whereas Hudson 
and Maioli (2010, p. 56) state that we need “to recover that common sense and 
morality we pushed aside”. Peter Singer, one of the most prominent ethicists 
in the world, could not help himself to observe that, since the onset of the cri-
sis, the Master of Business Administration Graduates at the Harvard Business 
School have been circulating an oath that commits them to pursue their work 
“in an ethical manner”; “to strive to create sustainable economic, social, and 
environmental prosperity worldwide”; and to manage their enterprises “in good 
faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow 
ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.” In an article pub-
lished in 2009, Singer asks himself: “Do business managers have a commitment 
to anything more than the success of their company and to making money? It 
would be hard to say that they do. Indeed, many business leaders deny that there 
is any con%ict between self-interest and the interests of all. Adam Smith’s “invis-
ible hand,” they believe, ensures that the pursuit of our own interests in the free 
market will further the interests of all.” (Singer, 2009) !us, the “invisible hand” 
engages business men in a ruthless quest for market share, whereas ethics is 
usually eclipsed by the need to obtain pro#ts in a free (i.e. deregulated) market. 
An anatomy of the crisis demands a more exact approach, concerned with 
the speci#c events that shaped the world’s economic and political image. 
As the crisis bears a “made in USA” label, the history of the crisis leads us 
in the United States of America. In the April 2007 edition of the ”Global 
Financial Stability Report”, the economists at the International Monetary 
Fund signaled a slight destabilization of the #nancial markets, given by the 
weakening of the U.S. housing market and potential cross-border spillovers 
(IMF, 2007). Also, IMF economists pointed out that the American credit risk 
was highly concentrated among subprime borrowers—i.e., those borrowers 
with impaired or limited credit histories—which in 2006 accounted for over 
14% of the residential mortgage-related securities market (idem). According 
to the Mortgage Bankers Association National Survey, the subprime mortgage 
delinquencies increased sharply right before the crisis, from approx. 5% in 
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2005 to over 30% in 2007. Tightened credit rules were a double edged measure. 
!e most obvious and intended e$ect was to prevent the apparition of new 
mortgage-related delinquencies. !e unintended and far-reaching e$ect was 
the impossibility of many subprime borrowers to pay back their credits. !e 
impossibility of payment brought an injection of executable mortgages on the 
American market, which caused the collapse of the real estate prices. 
In January 2011, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission published the #rst 
o&cial report on the roots of the economic crisis. !e “Final Report of the Na-
tional Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
United States” basically details the American economic downturn by departing 
from the events already signaled by the IMF economists in mid-2007. !e free 
fall of the real estate market and the abrupt shut down of subprime lending 
caused losses for many #nancial corporations. One of the #rst omens of the 
turmoil was the fall of the ABX index – i.e., a trading index speci#c for #nancial 
services companies – by 5% at the end of 2006 (US, 2011, p. 32) !e #rst victims 
of the borrowers’ decreasing trust were several small to medium #nancial ser-
vices companies, such as Mortgage Solutions or Sebring Capital that went bank-
rupt at the end of 2006. Still, the risk o&cers within the top #ve banks in the 
US foresaw that the collapse of the subprime lenders was only a matter of time. 
!is seemed like a self-ful#lling prophecy in 2007 and 2008, when famous big 
#nancial corporations, such as Citibank, HBSC, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers 
faced serious problems. In recent literature, one can #nd several even opposing 
explanations for the collapse of the American banking system. For example, 
Aalbers (2008) argues that the state enabled both securitization and subprime 
lending, and Gotham (2006) analyses the deregulation of the mortgage market. 
Hudson and Maioli (2010, p. 55) consider that the absence of state regulations is 
a myth of the actual #nancial crisis, arguing that „part of the guilt is to be shared 
with many regulators whose actions were absent or ine&cient”. !e Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission admits that „widespread failures in #nancial regula-
tion and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s #nancial 
markets” (US Congress, 2011, p. xviii). 
Joseph Stiglitz o$ers us a comprehensive and more balanced, we dare say, analy-
sis of the American crisis. „To understand what happened, you have to begin by 
asking what the #nancial sector is supposed to do. It’s very simple: it is supposed 
to allocate capital and manage risk, both with low transaction costs. If I were to 
grade our (the US) #nancial system, I would have to give it an F.” (Stiglitz, 2010, 
p. 322). Stiglitz „peels back the onion” and concludes that the American crisis 
has been unfolding in front of our own eyes during the last decade. In his own 
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words, „the only surprise about the economic crisis of 2008 was that it came as a 
surprise to so many” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 53). !e #rst signal, Stiglitz believes, was 
the American invasion in Iraq, which determined a fast increase in the price of 
the oil barrel – from only $34 in March 2003 to $137 in July 2008 (idem). !is 
meant that the US used to spend $1,4 billion per day for importing oil. !e 
#nancial shocks have been further facilitated by the lack of smart crediting and 
subpriming, and, also, by the banks’ increasing risk appetite. 
Straightforward, one can identify at least two important neuralgic points of the 
American crisis (Gri&th-Jones, Ocampo & Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 19 – 50). !e #rst 
is related to incentive problems, raised by both executives, accounting #rms, 
and rating agencies, which encouraged the provision of misleading information 
about the corporate performance. In addition, the bail-out procedures put in 
place by the Federal Reserve were subject to a paradox. Instead of saving the #-
nancial corporations, the bail-out contributed to the further aggravation of their 
situation by triggering two important mechanisms. First, the banks bene#ting 
from bail-out funding lost the con#dence of their clients and investors. Second, 
as the Federal Reserve did not put any conditions related to how the bail-out 
funds should be spent, the bene#ting corporations preferred to keep the liquidi-
ties for their own and to freeze the crediting. Unfortunately, many of these li-
quidities were also invested in executive bonuses and incentives schemes.
 !e second neuralgic point was created by economic modeling problems. 
Adam Smith’s „invisible hand”, rejuvenated by Milton Friedman, was consid-
ered as a given by many contemporary economists. !e key principles derived 
from natural rate theory were that „a) markets are e&cient (...); b) monetary 
policy is neutral to the real economy and the #scal policy” (Schettkat, 2010, 
p. 299). !ese principles have guided economic policy since the 1970s and 
have prevented governmental intervention in #nancial a$airs, including regu-
lations in the banking sector. Given these neuralgic aspects, one could agree 
that „recessions can be seen as the tip of the iceberg” (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 293). 
!e systemic market failures from underneath the iceberg give rise in the ag-
gregate to structural ine&ciencies.  
The contagion 
Given the short time span in which the USA exported their crisis in Europe and 
elsewhere, many specialists believe that globalization in itself is not a complete 
answer to the question ”How could this rapid contagion happen?”. In mid-
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2007, the IMF mentioned that it was unlikely that the American problems 
would a$ect other economies. Additionally, in the June 2007 edition of the 
Financial Stability Review, the economists within the European Central Bank 
stated that “with the euro area #nancial system in a generally healthy condition 
and the economic outlook remaining favorable, the most likely prospect is that 
#nancial system stability will be maintained in the period ahead.” (European 
Central Bank, 2007, p. 9). Obviously, key international #nancial institutions 
overestimated the self-regulating capacity of free markets. !e unexpected 
degree of global contagion started to be signaled at the end of 2007, when 
both IMF and ECB increased their market risk expectations. 
Several specialists under the umbrella of United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development analyzed the means by which the US exported their own cri-
sis (UNCTAD, 2009, pp. 4-9). !ey identi#ed several rather macroeconomic 
mechanisms that led to this rapid and (for some) unexpected increase in mag-
nitude of the economic quake. One channel of contagion was the global imbal-
ances’ phenomenon, an over debated subject in dedicated literature. In short, 
“global imbalances meant that there was excess saving from the surplus coun-
try, and excess saving lead to low interest rates, and low interest rates can feed 
bubbles.” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 325). A"er the end of the global system of Bretton 
Woods, it has become possible to identify an “Anglo-Saxon” part of the global 
economy, on the one hand, and an “Euro-Japanese” component, on the other. 
One key characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon economy was given by its rather 
liberal and rather laissez-faire character. An irrevocable trust in the “invisible 
hand” was successful in stimulating growth and job creations, and, more im-
portant, in creating a consumption boom that was not funded from real domes-
tic income. As regards the Euro-Japanese economies, growth remained rather 
sluggish, which meant that people were encouraged to make savings. !e result 
was that, for example, at the end of 2010, the average household savings rate in 
countries belonging to the “Euro-Japanese” block (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland) was of 11,1%, whereas in USA and UK was 
of only 3,3% (OECD Economic Outlook No. 85, 2010). !is is not only but also 
an important indicator of how people in the two di$erent types of economies 
manage their personal funds. Following this market philosophy, the US, as well 
as several countries from Western and Southern Europe, were more prone to 
fund their investments from credits, instead of saving and investing.  
!e “savings glut”, which is another critical point of discussions about the 
global crisis, goes hand in hand with the global imbalances phenomenon. 
Many countries from the Euro-Japanese block started to accumulate billions 
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of dollars as a measure for securing themselves against the international risks 
(UNCTAD, 2009). However, these savings gave birth to what Joseph Stiglitz 
calls “the paradox of thri"” (2010, p. 326), this meaning that an increase in 
savings may actually lead to a weaker economy. !e capital is not released 
in the economy and it is simply kept in the national safe. By not fueling the 
economy with liquidities, these economies contributed implicitly to the 
aggravation of the crisis 
By investigating the organizational dimension of the crisis, one may identify 
another important contagion channel – the institutional contagion. From the 
institutional side, the short-term success of the Anglo-Saxon economies gave 
birth to a revolution. According to Robert Hudson and Sara Maioli (2010, pp. 
53-70), emerging economies tried to replicate the success stories of Anglo-
Saxon corporations by simply replicating their business model. “For example, 
countries whose institutional environment historically encouraged savings 
saw a cultural shi" and a move towards acceptance of debt and a so"ening of 
regulation.” (Hudson & Maioli, 2010, p. 60). 
As regards the European Union, the #rst reaction in relation to the American 
crisis was to simply decouple from the unappealing turmoil. !is was hardly 
possible from various reasons, already described. In the #rst place, the belt-
tightening exercise done by countries in the continental Europe (i.e. Germany 
and France) resulted in slow or no wage growth, which determined a decline 
in the consumption trends. In the second place, it is estimated that one fourth 
of the American “toxic” mortgages went abroad (Stiglitz, 2010). In this way, 
the US succeeded in exporting its own crisis to Asia and mostly in Europe. In 
the third place, the institutional contagion transformed many #nancial orga-
nizations in Europe, and made them rely on high debt and leveraging. Last but 
not least, the US exported their deregulatory philosophy and made European 
institutions believe in the emblematic “invisible hand” of free markets.  
The crisis in the European Union
Impressed by the success of American #nancial services, large European 
banks had aggressively expanded in the USA. !is rapid expansion was also 
due to the Financial Services Action Plan, an ambitious program launched 
by the European Commission a"er the introduction of the euro in 1999. !e 
Financial Services Action Plan was meant to create an integrated #nancial 
system in the Euro area (Frangakis, 2009) and was strongly in%uenced by 
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the American model, “giving priority to promoting market-based forms of 
#nance, and encouraging #nancial institutions to become more competitive” 
(Evans, 2011, p. 98). 
!e institutional contagion was triggered by the American banking dream 
of making huge pro#ts from, by using a rather small amount of real capital. 
Betting on subpriming and high leveraging was not a winning strategy in the 
long run. According to estimates done by the IMF, the total losses incurred 
by euro area banks between 2007 and 2010 amounted to $630 billion, which 
places them rather close to the #gure for American banks of $878 billion (IMF, 
2010b). Similar to the bail-out strategy put in place by the Federal Reserve in 
the US, European governments provided guarantees for bank lending in their 
attempt to equilibrate the #nancial market. !e total commitment done by 
euro area governments accounted for 28% of the area’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), which is comparable to the total commitment done by the Federal 
Reserve of 26% of the American GDP (IMF, 2010a). !ese are only a few of 
the striking numbers that can make us create a rather realistic picture of the 
crisis in Europe. 
!e recession in the euro area o&cially ended in mid-2009, even though 
the social strain was still to come. In the second half of the year output 
#nally began to rise again and growth strengthened in the #rst half of 2010. 
Nevertheless, economic output remained below the level it had reached 
prior to the onset of the crisis and, while the unemployment rate did edge 
downwards in some countries, most notably Germany. !e #rst austerity 
measures were implemented by Ireland in December 2009, which included 
reducing civil servants’ pay, cutting welfare payments and child bene#ts 
(Financial Times, 2009). Other Member States (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Poland) soon embarked in the austerity train. !ese measures were 
subject to controversies, as they reduced the purchase power and, implicitly, 
the economic output in several countries. Furthermore, the austerity measures 
were too much about cutting salaries and they simply eluded the necessity for 
several speci#c indicators that would make the measures more equitable and 
certainly more bearable. 
!e Greek crisis was by far the gravest challenge that the single currency has 
faced since its creation, in 1999. In May 2010, the European Commission 
together with the IMF granted Greece with a 110 billion EUR loan. !is is 
the most expensive country bail-out in the history of the European Union. 
However, taxpayers in Germany and elsewhere were understandably riled 
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with this decision. Another 100 billion Euro bail-out package for Greece was 
approved in 2012. 
Another country hit very hard by the crisis was Ireland, which had to cope with 
the failure of its oversized banking system. As compared to Greece, Ireland 
was not a direct bene#ciary of the Commission’s emergency funds. By middle 
2011, the Irish government succeeded in funding its own skyrocketing de#cit. 
In 2011, the Irish bank started to support their operations with support from 
the ECB, who repeatedly lent money to the Irish banking sector. In this way, 
Ireland succeeded in preserving its economic status quo. 
Both the Greek and the Irish cases point out to a weakness of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) – the economic and monetary union cannot be 
feasible in the absence of the #scal union. When the institutional framework 
for the EMU was constructed during the 1990s this question was discussed 
under the heading: “Can a monetary union without a political union be 
stable?”. Many analysts and economists remained rather skeptical at that 
time. “One side implication of this strategic decision was that it became 
impossible to unify banking supervision in the common currency area.” 
(Gros, 2009, p. 106). !ese de#ciencies in #scal regulation and supervision 
had been identi#ed as a potential weakness of the EMU ever since its creation. 
!e new supervisory institutions settled in 2011 at European level might be 
able to correct this weakness and to create the prerequisites for a transparent 
monitoring system. For the second half of 2011, the ECB forecast remains 
pessimistic, “as the sovereign risk crisis and its interplay with the banking 
sector worsened in an environment of weakening macroeconomic growth 
prospects.” (ECB, 2011, p. 9). 
!e recession in the euro area o&cially ended in mid-2009, which did not 
actually mean that Europe could consider itself in a safe position. !e social 
and economic strain was only at its beginnings. !e extreme economic 
turmoil divided the European public sphere between “net contributors” (i.e. 
Germany, France) of the crisis and “net bene#ciaries” (i.e. Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and new member states). However, this division is rather perception-
based, than facts-based, as the underlining causes of the crisis in the periphery 
of the European Union are deeply rooted in structural ine&ciencies and lack 
of coordination at the central level. 
Under the pressure exerted by both intra-European (i.e. the dilution of 
convergence, the polarization of the Member States, the private debt in the 
152 | Loredana RADU (2013)
America’s Economic Crisis and Europe’s Hamletian Dilemma
new member states) and extra-European forces (the pressure of globalization, 
the emergence of China as a genuine global player), Europe is “in the midst 
of a fundamental reordering” (Ilves, 2012, p. 44). !e “two-speed” Europe is 
currently fueled by a discretionary division between the EU-17 (euro zone) 
and a slower non euro periphery. !e analysts have gone even further and 
discuss about a periphery of the euro zone, consisting in those member states 
that did not achieve considerable economic outputs and recovery. Finland’s 
European Minister, Alexander Stubb, has proposed a new “geometry” of the 
EU, based on economic ranking. “Within the EU-17 there is a divide between 
Germany, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands, a core Triple-A, net-payers, 
plus a second tier of Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia, neither Triple-A not net-
payer. And, on the other side, we can #nd Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
that for a variety of reasons have failed to follow the rules. In between there 
are euro-area members such as AAA Luxembourg, AA+ France, and AA 
Belgium, net payers, whose positions on #scal disciplines are somewhat 
more ambiguous.” (idem). !erefore, within the framework of the crisis, the 
“two-speed” Europe risks to become a “three-speed Europe”, split among the 
#rst tier of countries (Germany, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands), the 
second-tier countries consisting in the new periphery of the euro-zone, and a 
third-tier composed of the states outside the monetary union. 
During the crisis, nine out of the ten countries form Central and Eastern Eu-
rope passed through recession. Latvia and Estonia have entered the recession 
ever since 2008. Romania is tributary to the same economic patterns that af-
fected the emerging economies in the European Union. !e abundance of 
cheap money, the real estate boom, the weakness of the #nancial regulatory 
system created important vulnerabilities that brought Romania on the edge of 
economic collapse. Similar to other states from the periphery of the EU, Roma-
nia bene#ted from the #nancial support on behalf of the IMF, EU, and EBRD. 
D. Dăianu considers that the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are 
among the states most a$ected by the crisis (2011, p. 2). Except for Poland, all 
these economies encountered very serious problems, while the public de#cit 
rocketed. !e #nancial support from the EU, the IMF, and other international 
#nancial institutions was a necessary solution. Starting from 2010, the EU 
periphery (the so-called “new member states”) became the new bridgehead 
of the European crisis. !e IMF experts speak about the problems of the 
European Union periphery as being “particularly acute” (IMF, 2011, xv). 
Furthermore, “reestablishing #scal and #nancial sustainability in the face of 
low or negative growth and high interest rates is a substantial challenge. And, 
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while extreme, the problems of the EU periphery point to a more general 
problem: an underlying low rate of growth of potential output. Adjustment is 
very hard when growth is very low.” (IMF, 2011, xv).
Conclusion. European Union’s Hamletian dilemma
What started as a banking crisis in the US, ended as a solidarity crisis in the 
EU, or, into the words of one of the most prominent German philosophers, 
into a “crisis of the European Union” (Habermas, 2012a). !e current crisis 
has unveiled at least three structural vulnerabilities of the Union. First, the 
multi-speed Europe has emerged as a painful reality, pointing out to the fact 
that Member States are, indeed, extremely di$erent in terms of economic 
opportunities and, also, in terms of political positioning. Second, European 
leaders’ inability to e$ectively cope with the crisis in 2009 and 2010 translated 
into a slow-paced response to critical events, and, ultimately, into uninspired 
political decisions. Here we could rightfully speak of a generalized political 
myopia with long-term negative impact at all levels. !ird, the general 
perception that certain Member-States (e.g. Greece) are to be blamed for 
Europe’s turmoil, thus having to pay the crisis’ bill, fuels nationalist movements, 
which radically put the European project under the question mark.   
!ere is general consent that the current economic crisis in general and the 
euro crisis, in particular, place the European Union in a very unsafe position 
in both economic and political terms. !ere are important voices’ talking 
about Europe’s being situated at the crossroads, somewhere between growing 
euroskepticism and decreasing “europhoria”. Many believe that the EU heads 
towards inevitable dissolution, whereas others dare say that the only solution 
for Europe is to go beyond national interests and to #nally discover the “”holy 
grail” of political federalization.   
Jurgen Habermas, probably the most prominent philosopher at the present 
time, considers that.. 
…only a signi#cant consolidation of European integration can sustain a 
common currency without the need for a never-ending series of bailouts, 
which in the long term would strain the solidarity of the European national 
populations in the eurozone on both sides – donor countries and recipients 
– to breaking point. !is means, however, that a transfer of sovereignty 
to European institutions is unavoidable in order to impose e$ective #scal 
discipline and guarantee a stable #nancial system. (Habermas, 2012b)
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 !e gap between the two Europes – the core Europe, made of the “old member 
states” vs. the peripheral Europe composed of the “new member states” – 
has been clearly and somehow dramatically revealed during the European 
negotiations over the EU’s budget for the next programming period (2014-
2020). Signi#cantly reduced, the 2014-2020 EU Budget was approved a"er the 
European Summit on the 7th and the 8th of February 2013. In his o&cial speech 
on the outcome of the new European Multiannual Financial Framework, 
Jose Manuel Barroso declared that “the Commission would of course have 
preferred an outcome with more ambition for Europe.” !e European project 
is torn under the pressure of two opposing forces: the national interests vs. 
the European unity. !e European solidarity is under the question mark, as 
political leaders seem unwilling to make the big and promising step towards 
the political uni#cation. 
Unexpectedly, in a speech given in February 2013, German President Joachim 
Gauck identi#es the true source of strain for Europe and calls for a reconcili-
ation among all Member-States: 
Attractive though Europe is, the European Union leaves too many people 
feeling powerless and without a voice. I hear this and read it on almost a daily 
basis and can tell you: there are issues in Europe that need clearing up. When 
I see all the signs of people’s impatience, exhaustion and frustration, when I 
hear about polls showing a populace unsure about pursuing “more” Europe, 
it seems to me that we are pausing on a new threshold – unsure whether we 
should really stride out on the onward journey. !ere is more to this crisis 
than its economic dimension. It is also a crisis of con#dence in Europe as a 
political project. !is is not just a struggle for our currency; we are struggling 
with an internal quandary too. (Gauck, 2013)
!is “paci#st” speech may throw a veil of optimism on European politics, 
especially that it comes from the leader of EU’s most powerful economy, 
and, implicitly, from the EU’s most important contributor. What is at stake? 
As many scholars put it before, “more” Europe is the only way to survive 
in today’s world. More Europe would give us, the Europeans, the right to 
actually mean something on an enlarged and globalized political scene. With 
economic mammoths rising fast, with emerging countries catching up, more 
Europe would grant Member-States with the opportunity to play a key-role 
on the international stage. In this context, Europe must solve its Hamletian 
dilemma by using the logic of integration. !us, “to be” is Europe’s categorical 
imperative in an era of solidarity.   
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